PAIS: Parallelization Aware Instruction Scheduling for Improving Soft-error Reliability of GPU-based Systems

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Abstract—For decades the semiconductor industry has been driven by Moore’s Law and performed aggressive technology scaling to achieve low-power and high-performance. Meanwhile, the semiconductor industry has faced severe reliability challenges like soft-error. Many methodologies (such as redundancy methodologies) have been proposed to improve the soft-error reliability of the GPU. In this paper, we propose a novel GPU architecture-aware compilation methodology to further improve the soft-error reliability. The proposed methodology jointly considers the parallel behavior of the GPU and the applications and minimizes the vulnerability of the GPU applications during instruction scheduling. The experimental results show that our methodology is able to perform the scheduling within 5.88 seconds on average and achieves soft-error reliability improvement up to 40% compared to the state-of-the-art compilation techniques. The results show that the performance and power overheads of our methodology are less than 10% in most of the cases.

I. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, GPUs are widely used in devices ranging from small handheld devices to real-time embedded systems in order to satisfy the growing demand for low-power and high-performance computing [10][21]. In order to provide low-power and high-performance GPU-based systems, the semiconductor industry has done aggressive technology scaling. However, such scaling has also led to severe reliability issues like soft-errors. Since the GPU performs most of the computation-intensive workload, reliability of the GPU is essential for the functionality of the GPU-based systems [26]. Moreover, in [7], it is shown that the real-world GPUs are susceptible to the soft-errors even under normal conditions.

Research has been conducted to improve the soft-error reliability of semiconductor devices including the GPUs. Works in [18] and [20] use instruction scheduling to improve the soft-error reliability of applications. However, since this instruction scheduling is tailored for the RISC processors (SPARC-V8 architecture), it is not scalable to the GPU. Works in [4], [9], and [23] show the problem of soft-error reliability on the GPU by using various methodologies (i.e. GPU memory test), but they do not provide specific solutions to improve the soft-error reliability of the GPU. One proposed technique to optimize soft-error reliability is an application framework for detecting DRAM errors in GPUs and recovering from the checkpoints [13]. Work in [22] has proposed a redundancy methodology, where duplication of the critical parts of the GPU pipeline is used to recompute erroneous results when error is detected. In [25], an application level redundancy methodology has been proposed for minimizing performance overhead of error detection and recomputation by recycling the idle time of the GPU. However, since these research works are based on redundancy or recomputation, the amount of performance and power overhead required to implement their strategies can be significant.

Research has been conducted to leverage the parallel behavior of the GPU to improve the soft-error reliability. The relation between the parallelism of the GPU and reliability is discussed extensively in [6]. Work in [17] shows that modifying the grid and the block size of a GPGPU application will affect the parallel execution of the GPU

and the Mean Executions Between Failures (MEBF). However, the method to find the reliable grid and block size is not proposed.

Research has been conducted to identify and protect the vulnerable parts of GPGPU applications. Work in [5] identifies vulnerable parts from a GPGPU application and inserts checker functions to protect these parts. Work in [12] has proposed a memory access protection methodology by inserting checker instructions into a GPGPU application during compile-time. However, since the soft-errors can occur in any part of a GPGPU application, the improvement of GPU soft-error reliability from these works is limited.

In summary, the above-mentioned state-of-the-art methodologies suffer from the following two limitations:
1) They consider the parallel execution flow of GPU at the application level but they do not provide efficient compilation methodologies to further improve soft-error reliability.
2) They are based on redundancy or recomputation which can lead to significant performance and power overhead.

![Fig. 1: Motivational Example to Illustrate the Relation Between Vulnerable Period and Instruction Schedule.](image)

A. Motivational Case Study on Vulnerable Period Analysis

In order to observe the impact of instruction scheduling in a vulnerable period\(^1\), we have modified the instruction schedule in a matrix multiplication application and created two additional applications with different instruction schedules. We then measured the vulnerable period of these three matrix multiplication applications (including the original instruction schedule) by using GPGPU-Sim [2] simulator and demonstrate the experimental results in Figure 1. Below we provide some observations of these experimental results.

\(^1\)The vulnerable period is the metric to measure the soft-error reliability of a GPU application. The vulnerable period is the time from the moment that the data is produced until the last moment that the data is consumed [14]. See section II for more detailed definition and Section III for the vulnerable period estimation technique.
Hardware oriented techniques such as [1], [3], and [27] can additionally be applied with reliability improvement for GPU and can further be applied with the best of our knowledge, this work is the first GPU compiler work that uses instruction scheduling to improve soft-error reliability.

Fig. 2: Overview of the Proposed Soft-error Reliability Improvement Methodology.

Observations:

1) The vulnerable period is fluctuating instead of clearly uptrending/downtrending.
2) A certain instruction schedule does not always have the smallest vulnerable period. For example, Scheduling Algorithm 1 shows the smallest vulnerable period when the number of threads is 625. However, when the number of threads is 841, Scheduling Algorithm 2 shows the smallest vulnerable period.
3) Instruction scheduling algorithms may lead to insufficient protection if only application behavior is taken into account.

The experimental results imply that the vulnerable period of an application is affected by both the instruction scheduling and the parallel behavior of the GPU. Therefore, an instruction schedule needs to take parallel behavior of the GPU into consideration to further improve the soft-error reliability.

B. Problem and Research Challenges

The problem of compile-time vulnerable period minimization to improve soft-error reliability poses the following research challenges:

1) To minimize the vulnerable period of an application during compile-time, it is important to estimate the vulnerable period of GPU applications by considering the accurate GPU execution model.
2) Efficiently decide which instruction should be chosen and where it should be scheduled to minimize the total vulnerable period of an application. Moreover, the solution must ensure that the application programmer does not experience additional compilation overhead.

C. Our Novel Contributions

To address the above-mentioned challenges, we propose a novel methodology to minimize the vulnerable period of an application on a GPU platform which employs:

1) A Parallelization Aware Instruction Scheduling (PAIS) Algorithm (Section IV-A) that minimizes the total vulnerable period of a GPU application by considering the impact of the parallel behavior of the GPU. To support this algorithm, we require:  

2) Estimation of the vulnerable period during compile-time (Section III) of a GPU application, which provides the thread-level information for the GPU.

3) A fine-grained clock cycle-level fault injection tool (Section V-A) to verify our methodology. The fault injection tool that can randomly inject faults at the granularity of clock cycle-level is integrated with the state-of-the-art GPGPU-Sim simulator.

Figure 2 shows the overview of the methodology in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first GPU compiler work that uses instruction scheduling to improve the soft-error reliability. The proposed compilation methodology bears strong potential for reliability improvement for GPU and can additionally be applied with hardware oriented techniques such as [1], [3], and [27].

II. System Models

We consider a GPGPU as a target GPU application. A typical GPGPU application is composed of a host code and a kernel code. The former is executed on a CPU and the latter is on a GPU. The proposed instruction scheduling and vulnerable period estimation algorithms are designed based on architecture similar to the Fermi architecture which is proposed by NVIDIA [15]. Our target GPU contains several Streaming Multiprocessors (SMs), which consist of many stream processors.

Application Model: The host orchestrates overall behavior of a GPGPU application and the kernel handles most of the computation in the GPGPU application. When the host launches a GPU kernel, the host must set the configuration for the GPU kernel to create the thread hierarchy, where the grid indicates the dimension of the thread block and the blocksize indicates the number of threads in the thread block.

GPU and Fault Model: During execution, based on the configuration, thread blocks are assigned to SMs and the threads in the thread blocks are grouped into several warps which are the smallest execution unit of a GPU. A single instruction is fetched for each warp, and every thread in the same warp executes the same instruction in lock-step unless there is a divergent control flow. The execution of the thread blocks is possible in any order; in parallel or in sequence. Due to the complexity of predicting the dynamic behavior of a GPU, we assume that the GPU uses the round robin algorithm to schedule the warps as has been adopted in [2] as well.

In this paper, we consider neutron-induced soft-errors at a given rate and assume that neutron-induced soft-errors are evenly distributed over the GPU area. Among several soft-error reliability quantification methodologies, the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) [14] and the Instruction Vulnerability Index (IVI) [19] are two of the most well-known metrics used for quantifying the soft-error reliability. The AVF is the probability of visible errors caused by the soft-errors happened in hardware components. Basically, the AVF is estimated according to the life time of data (from the time it is produced until the last time it is consumed, a temporal effect), i.e. its vulnerable period. Instead of solely considering the temporal effect, the IVI further considers the spatial effect, where each hardware component has a different probability of a soft-error occurrence. We consider AVF in this paper due to the fact that a detailed Register Transfer Level (RTL) model of the GPU is not available to the research community. However, our methodology can also be scalable to the IVI metric if the spatial effect can be estimated for GPUs as it has been done for the single-core SPARC-V8 CPU in [19].

III. Estimation of Vulnerable Period on the GPU

During run-time, each warp runs instructions in lock-step and it is assumed that the GPU hardware schedules the warps in a round-robin manner [2]. The latency of the instruction execution is related to the parallel behavior of warps on the pipeline stages of the GPU, where the access latency in the memory system is jointly taken into account [8]. Below we provide more details about the latency of the instruction execution.

A. Latency of Instruction Execution

The \((i+1)\)th instruction will be issued after all warps have issued the \(i\)th instruction. Therefore, instruction issue latency, \(t_{issue}\).
shown in Figure 3 is represented by the following equation:
\[ t_{\text{issue}} = \frac{\text{n}_\text{warp} \times \text{sizeof}(\text{warp})}{\text{n}_\text{core} \times t_{\text{issue}}} \]  
where \( n_{\text{warp}} \) represents the number of warps in a thread block, \( n_{\text{core}} \) represents the number of streaming processors in a single SM, and \( t_{\text{issue}} \) represents the instruction issue rate.

For the pipeline stages of a GPU and the number of instructions, \( n \), the execution time is determined by \( t_{\text{issue}} \) and the instruction execution latency, \( L_{\text{exe}}(I_n) \). Moreover, a data dependent instruction will be held back at the issue stage until its operands are ready. \( L_i \) represents the latency of the instruction that \( I \) depends on. Therefore, the complete execution time of the \( n \) instructions may be described by the following equation:
\[ E_{\text{exec}}(I_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (L_i + t_{\text{issue}}) + L_{\text{exe}}(I_n) \]  
(2)

To accurately measure the latency of the data dependent instructions, the latency of the arithmetic and memory access instructions needs to be considered.

For arithmetic instructions, different execution latencies will lead to different data dependent latencies. The data dependent latency is the period between the default issue time and the ready issue time of a dependent instruction. Figure 3 shows an example of the default and the ready issue time. The default issue time is the time that all the previous instruction is issued. The default issue time could be estimated by the summation of data dependent latency and the \( t_{\text{issue}} \) for all the instructions preceding the instruction, \( I_n \). The ready issue time is the time that all the data dependency for the instruction \( I_n \) is resolved. Note that the ready issue time is always greater and equal to the default issue time. The ready issue time may be estimated by the instruction whose execution time is the longest and has finished after the default issue time of the dependent instructions. Here, we need to look more closely since the issue time always overlaps with the execution latency. Therefore, subtraction of the overlapped issue time from the execution latency is the data dependent latency. In Figure 3, the instruction \( I_{n-2} \) actually dominates the dependent latency since it has the longest execution time. The dependent latency is two clock cycles for \( I_n \) because one overlapped issue cycle of \( I_{n-2} \) and one overlapped issue cycle of \( I_{n-1} \) are subtracted from the longest execution time.

For memory access instructions, the execution latency is the same as the memory access latency without the instruction issue latency. Figure 4 shows an example of the memory access latency. Assuming that the system has adopted DDR2 memory, the maximum memory bandwidth, \( BW_{\text{MEM}} \), should be the bandwidth of the bus multiplied by the clock frequency of memory. Since it may be impossible to predict the exact cache behavior during compile-time, we use average memory access time to estimate the latency of the memory access instruction.

\[ BW_{\text{MEM}} = \text{Buswidth} \times \text{Memory_freq} \times 2 \]  
(3)

During run-time, each memory access may consume some amount of memory bandwidth, which may be estimated by the following equation:
\[ \text{bw} = \text{Fetch_{size}} \times \text{Core_{freq}} \]  
(4)

Therefore, we can obtain the number of concurrent memory accesses in one memory transaction from the following equation:
\[ N_{\text{mem-req}} = \lfloor \frac{BW_{\text{MEM}}}{\text{bw}} \rfloor \]  
(5)

The total number of memory accesses, \( n_{\text{mem-req}} \), may be estimated by the following equation:
\[ n_{\text{mem-req}} = n_{\text{warp}} \times N_{\text{SM}} \]  
(6)

We find the total number of memory transactions sent from SMs to memory and then multiply it by the average memory access latency, \( L_{\text{avg-mem}} \), since the memory operation is handled sequentially. By using this information, the memory access latency \( L_{\text{mem}} \) may be estimated by using the following equation:
\[ L_{\text{mem}} = \left( \frac{n_{\text{mem-req}}}{N_{\text{mem-req}}} \right) \times L_{\text{avg-mem}} - \left( \frac{n_{\text{warp}} - 1}{n_{\text{warp}}} \right) \times t_{\text{issue}} \]  
(7)

From this equation we can observe that in order to estimate the execution latency of a memory access instruction, it is necessary to subtract its issue latency from the memory access latency.

![Fig. 3: Example Pipeline Stages of Arithmetic Instructions.](image)

![Fig. 4: Example Pipeline Stages of Memory Access Instructions.](image)

**Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Computing Vulnerable Period.**

**Input:** Instruction Flow Graph \( G \), configuration \( c \), \# of SM \( N_{\text{SM}} \)

**Output:** Total vulnerable period \( \text{TotVulnPeriod} \)

1. Function EstimateVulnPeriod \((G, c, N_{\text{SM}})\);
2. begin
3. InitializeGraph(); // Initialize the node and the edge variables
4. TotVulnPeriod ← 0;
5. ProgMissMatchFlag ← 0;
6. \( G ← \text{DuplicateGraph}(G, c, N_{\text{SM}}); \)
7. foreach \( N ∈ G \) do
8. \( \text{IsReachable}(N, \text{isReachable}); \)
9. SetNodeInfo(tissue, isReachable);
10. if isReachable ∈ N do
11. if isReachable ∈ N then
12. \( n_{\text{mem-access}} ← \text{FindAllDependentAccess}(N) \);
13. // Get the number of concurrent access
14. \( L_{\text{exe}}(N, n_{\text{mem-access}}); \) // Equation 3-7
15. else
16. \( L_{\text{exe}} ← \text{PipeLatency}(N); \)
17. SetOutgoingEdge(E, N, L_{exe});
18. foreach \( G ∈ E \) do
19. Edges ← Null;
20. if Edges ∈ G do
21. Edges ← Edges.find(E);
22. if Edges = NULL then
23. Edges.add(E);
24. else
25. SetLongest(Edges, E);
26. end
27. end
28. end
29. end
30. end
31. Output: \( \text{TotVulnPeriod} = \text{GetSummation}(G, \text{Edges}) \);
32. return \( \text{TotVulnPeriod} \);
33. end

Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code used to estimate the total vulnerable period of the application. As mentioned in Section III, we consider the parallel behavior of the GPU to estimate the vulnerable period. The instruction flow graph of the kernel code, \( G \), the configuration of the application, \( c \), and the number of SMs, \( N_{\text{SM}} \), are generated as inputs for our algorithm (Line 1). In the graph,
the instructions are represented as nodes whose outgoing edges, if existing, represent data dependancies between the instructions. Afterwards, the graph is updated while considering the degree of parallelism provided by the configuration $c$ and $N_{SM}$ of the target GPU architecture (Line 6). The loop (Lines 7-17) starts to update the weight of the edges which will store $L_{exe}$ from a node to its dependent nodes. For each node in the graph, $t_{issue}$ is estimated (Line 8) and then for each outgoing edge of the node $N$, the execution latency $L_{exe}$ is determined according to the node type (Lines 10-17). In the second loop (Lines 18-25), the total vulnerable period is explored by searching and adding the longest edge from each node.

### IV. PARALLELIZATION AWARE INSTRUCTION SCHEDULING

As mentioned in Section I-C, our goal is to find the instruction schedule that minimizes the vulnerable period of a GPU application. In order to find an optimal instruction schedule, it is necessary to verify every instruction schedule. However, the finding of an optimal instruction schedule is known to be an NP-hard problem [24]. The overhead of finding an optimal instruction schedule that minimizes the vulnerable period could be significant. Therefore, in order to find the best instruction schedule while minimizing the compilation overhead, we propose a heuristic function that schedules the instructions based on the data dependency.

#### Algorithm 2: Algorithm for Instruction Scheduling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input: Instruction Flow Graph $G_{in}$</th>
<th>Output: New Instruction Flow Graph $G_{new}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Function BuildFromBottom ($G_{in}$)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. $G_{new}.clear();$
2. $Pos ←∅;$
3. $n_{tgt} ←RegSet ←∅;$
4. while $G_{in} ≠ ∅ do$
5.     $CandidateSet ←∅;$
6.     if $Pos = G_{in}[n_{tgt}]$ then
7.         $n_{tgt} ←GetSinkNode(); G_{new}.push(n_{tgt});$
8.         $Pos ←Pos + 1;$
9.     else
10.        for $idx = 0; idx < Pos; idx = idx + 1 do$
11.            if $G_{in}[cnt].is_sync()$ then
12.                $pass ←false;$
13.            if $pass = true$ and $G_{in}[cnt].is_consumer(G_{in}[idx].GetDest())$ then
14.                $pass ←false;$
15.            if $pass = true$ and $G_{in}[idx].is_in_loop()$ then
16.                $pass ←false;$
17.            if $pass = true$ and $RegSet.exists(G_{in}[idx].GetDest())$ then
18.                $CandidateSet.push(G_{in}[idx]);$
19.        if $CandidateSet = ∅$ then
20.            $n_{tgt} ←GetLastNode();$
21.        else
22.            $n_{tgt} ←CandidateSet.front();$
23.        $G_{new}.push(n_{tgt});$
24.    $G_{in}.remove(n_{tgt});$
25.    $RegSet.RemoveDestReg(n_{tgt});$
26.    $RegSet.AddSrcReg(n_{tgt});$
27.    $Pos ←Pos + 1;$

A. Vulnerable Period Aware Instruction Scheduling

The vulnerable period of a register will reach a minimum if the distance between the producer and the consumer instructions is zero. The main object of the proposed heuristic is to place the producer instruction as close to the consumer instruction as possible. The proposed heuristic generates an instruction schedule by using a bottom-up strategy that starts from the last instruction of the application. The last instruction is selected and placed by the heuristic at the beginning of the instruction scheduling process. Afterward, the producer instructions corresponding to the last instruction are examined based on the following three conditions:

1. There is no synchronization instruction between the producer and the consumer instruction.
2. There is no other instruction that consumes the same data produced by the producer instruction.
3. The loop depth value of the producer instruction and the consumer instruction must be identical.

If the producer instruction satisfies all three conditions, then this instruction is eligible for scheduling and the heuristic places this instruction near the consumer instruction to minimize the vulnerable period. After that, the placed producer instruction becomes the consumer instruction and the heuristic iterates the above mentioned process until all the instructions are scheduled. **Algorithm 2** shows the pseudo-code for the proposed instruction scheduling algorithm. At the beginning, the last instruction is selected and placed in Lines 10-13. For each pair of producer and consumer instructions, the heuristic examines the three conditions in Lines 15-25. If the pair of instructions satisfies these three conditions, it will be placed near the consumer instruction in Lines 30-34. The overall complexity of the instruction scheduling algorithm is given by $O(n^3)$ because of the three levels loop hierarchy.

#### B. Example of the Proposed Instruction Scheduling

Figure 5 shows an example of the proposed instruction scheduling. In the figure, there are four producer and consumer instruction pairs: instructions in Lines 2 and 5, in Lines 6 and 9, in Lines 8 and 13, and in Lines 10 and 14.

The first pair of instructions, in Lines 2 and 5, violates the third condition because these instructions are not in the same loop. The second pair of instructions, in Lines 6 and 9, violates the first condition due to the synchronization instruction in Line 7. The third pair of instructions, in Lines 8 and 13, violates the second condition, because there is another consumption of the register $%r22$ in Line 11. However, the last pair of instructions, in Lines 10 and 14, satisfies all three conditions, and therefore the proposed heuristic is able to place the instruction in Line 10 around its consumer instruction, in Line 14.

#### V. RESULTS AND EVALUATION

A. Experimental Setup and Fault Injection Tool

Our methodology integrates the NVCC compiler and is capable of generating the kernel code with a minimum vulnerable period. During
the experiment, the proposed PAIS uses timing information that is extracted from the GPGPU-Sim [2] simulator in order to estimate vulnerable period and generate a reliable instruction schedule. The performance and average power consumption is measured by using the GPGPU-Sim and the GPUWatch [11].

For evaluating the soft-error reliability of the proposed PAIS, we have implemented a fine-grained clock cycle-level fault injection tool which is integrated with the GPGPU-Sim, as shown in Figure 6. In our fault injection tool, the kernel is executed twice in the GPGPU-Sim, where the effective fault log is generated during the first execution and the simulation result is returned as feedback for the second execution.

During the first execution, the fault injection tool periodically generates a list of injected faults that includes the faulty components and the clock cycle numbers. In every clock cycle, the fault injection tool checks the information in the injected fault list. An injected fault is considered as an effective fault if the following conditions are satisfied:

- Current clock cycle number is matched with the clock cycle number in the injected fault list.
- The status of the faulty component in the injected fault list is active.

If there is an effective fault, then the fault injection tool writes the following information into the effective fault log: the clock cycle number, SM number, thread id, instruction string, and the faulty component.

During the second execution, the fault injection tool obtains information from the effective fault log and flips one bit from the faulty component. After the second execution, the output is compared to the correct output which is produced without the fault injection. The output is categorized into correct output, incorrect output, and application crash, and application crash. For our experiments, we chose six benchmark applications for their intensive usage in GPU platforms. These benchmark applications are: Backprop, BFS, Srad, Kmeans, Matrix Multiplication, and Hotspot for basic arithmetic operation. During the experiment, each benchmark application is executed 15 times with various fault injection rates (10, 50, and 100 faults/1 Million (M) cycles).

**B. Experimental Results**

The PAIS algorithm execution time is obtained using an Intel Core i7 Quad-core processor at 3.5 GHz. During the experiment, our PAIS algorithm is able to perform the scheduling within 5.88 seconds on average. Figure 7 shows the vulnerable period improvement of the proposed PAIS. From the result, we observe a significant decrease in the vulnerable period of the applications except for the Hotspot application. This is because our algorithm could not cope with the Hotspot application’s heavy usage of synchronization instructions in the kernel function (Section IV-A).

Figure 8 compares the soft-error reliability improvement between PAIS, two reliability enhancement methodologies proposed in [5], and [12]. Since our instruction scheduling algorithm could not modify the original instruction, the vulnerable period is not changed.

![Fig. 7: Vulnerable Period Improvement.](Image 330x597 to 551x738)

![Fig. 8: Soft-error Reliability Improvement Compared to [5], [12]. Each Application is Executed 15 Times With Different Fault Injection Rates.](Image 67x437 to 283x547)

In addition, we observe that there is no correct output from the Matrix application with 100 faults/1M cycles fault injection rate. This is because the Matrix application is sensitive to fault. The failure rate of the Matrix application is already higher than 70% with 50 faults/1M cycles fault injection rate. Therefore, with 100 faults/1M cycles fault injection rate, the failure of the Matrix application is an expected outcome.

Furthermore, the overheads introduced by our PAIS are compared to [5] and [12], where Figures 9 and 10 show the performance and power overheads, respectively. The results show that the proposed PAIS causes a small amount of performance and power overhead compared to the original code because our PAIS does not insert any additional code into the application. However, in the Backprop application, a significant amount of performance overhead is caused because of: 1) the scheduling of the load/store instructions, and 2) the modification of the configuration.
In this paper, we have proposed a GPU architecture-aware compilation methodology to improve the soft-error reliability on the GPU platform. In the methodology, we have developed a novel instruction scheduling algorithm that decreases the vulnerable period to improve the soft-error reliability of hardware registers that hold the application data. We have analyzed the GPU architecture and have constructed the system model to estimate the total vulnerable period of the parallel executing threads on the GPU to find the best configuration. In addition, we have developed a fine-grained fault injection tool that is integrated with the state-of-the-art cycle-level GPU simulator to evaluate the proposed methodology. From the experimental results, we show that our methodology improves soft-error reliability up to 40% on average and our scheduling algorithm can generate a reliable schedule within 5.88 seconds as well. In addition, the results show that the performance and power overheads of our methodology are less than 10% in most cases.

VI. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES


